This article assesses the new industrial policies, commonly referred to as ‘sectoral strategies’, adopted by the Moroccan state in the early 2000s. These include the three Economic Emergence Plans covering the periods 2005–2009, 2009–2015 and 2014–2020, as well as the post–COVID-19 economic recovery plan implemented between 2021 and 2023.
The analysis considers whether these strategies prompted structural transformation in the Moroccan economy and diversification of its fabric of production, or whether they reinforced pre-existing patterns of economic dependence.
1. A Transitional Phase (1983–2005)
After abandoning earlier industrial policies (import substitution, protectionism and Moroccanisation), the state adopted an export-led industrial growth model. According to a 2014 document issued by the Royal Institute for Strategic Studies, during this period, Morocco relied on low labour costs as a strategy, thus putting the country at a relative advantage. At the same time, there were no corresponding efforts to introduce new technologies or develop skills to enhance specialisation.[1]
From 1983 onward, Morocco relied on low labour costs to pursue an international subcontracting strategy, especially in the textile and garment sector. However, the trade liberalisation policies Morocco embraced during the 1990s severely undermined this sector. Competition from Chinese and Turkish goods, combined with the opening of Eastern European markets where labour was better trained and sometimes cheaper, placed additional pressure on domestic producers.
The abolition of the Multi Fibre Arrangement[2] on 1 January 2005, which reshaped the global trades of textiles and garments, dealt a decisive blow to the local textile industry. The Royal Institute for Strategic Studies notes that new ‘global professions’, including automotive and aerospace, were unable to offset this imbalance: ‘The successes of companies such as Renault and Bombardier came at the cost of the collapse of the textile sector and the loss of competitiveness in the domestic market’.[3]
Alain Piveteau and others reached a similar conclusion: ‘The dynamism of new specialisation sectors, such as the automotive and aerospace industries, does not compensate for the decline in older production sectors’.[4]
Due to the weak domestic industrial infrastructure, exemplified in the lack of sufficient national production and the absence of high-quality local inputs,[5] most capital goods were supplied by foreign firms. This reliance obstructed the development of a domestic industrial sector.
The textile and garment industry thus remained dependent on imports for semi-finished products and equipment and was confined to subcontracting relationships with foreign suppliers. The Royal Institute for Strategic Studies described this situation during the early 2000s as follows:
‘This dynamic led to a surge in imports, undermined the gains achieved through export-promotion policies, and caused the trade deficit to become entrenched once again. On average, imports of manufactured goods were twice the value of exports of those same products’.[6]
The export-oriented, subcontracting-based industrialisation model encountered the same pitfalls as its predecessors. Most notably, the model failed to withstand foreign competition, because industries remained dependent on imported capital goods. Rather than engaging in actual industrial development, most companies favoured short-term strategies over risk-taking and long-term growth, focusing instead on low-cost production.
This dynamic contributed to the consolidation of a major structural obstacle to industrialisation in Morocco: the dominance of large supplier networks that prioritise profits derived from the marketing of imported goods over domestic production. The case of Société Anonyme Marocaine de l’Industrie du Raffinage (SAMIR) – Morocco’s sole oil refinery – offers a clear illustration of this pattern.
In the late 1990s, the state privatised this strategic national refinery. Beginning in 2002, it allowed major distributors to import petroleum products tax-free, enabling them to generate substantial profits at the expense of consumers. This policy shift raised fuel prices and increased Morocco’s dependence on foreign energy sources.
In the energy sector, the influence of domestic suppliers is particularly salient. Following the deliberate bankruptcy of SAMIR, which deprived the country of fuel storage capacity and weakened market regulation, the five largest firms came to control 70% of the market, with three firms alone accounting for 53%.[7]
SAMIR’s bankruptcy was not accidental. The Saudi investor Mohammed Al Amoudi, who acquired the company for 4 billion dirhams (approximately €384 million), left it with debts estimated at 43 billion dirhams (approximately €4.128 billion).[8]
The financial burden increased further after Al Amoudi initiated legal proceedings against the Moroccan state before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). By 2024, claims by Moroccan creditors had reached at least 96 billion dirhams (approximately €9.216 billion), around 80% of which was owed to the state, particularly to customs authorities and the Office des Changes, with the remainder owed to banks and suppliers.[9]
Major family-controlled capitalist institutions, particularly the royal family, pursued a strategy of repositioning in response to globalisation and international competition. The factional strategy relied on achieving growth through external expansion, including acquiring firms and purchasing shares and equity stakes in private companies and semi-public enterprises following their privatisation.[10]
This expansion was accompanied by a strong presence in the financial sector, notably banking and insurance, and more recently by partnerships with global capital to expand into the African continent. Here, the focus on the same traditional sectors remains: real estate, infrastructure, finance and telecommunications.
As a result, large Moroccan capital (including major suppliers, the royal family, and its close networks) has greatly benefited the existing economic configuration. It therefore has little incentive to break the vicious cycle that hinders the industrialisation of the Moroccan economy.
Small and medium-sized enterprises encountered these constraints directly and remained confined to outsourcing,[11] particularly in light industries such as textiles. Their productivity declined by 30% in 1990 compared to 1986, and they continued to face high production and operating costs in the short term, weak capitalisation, limited organisational and managerial capacity, and well-documented technological and digital lag. These challenges were further compounded by the narrow domestic market, itself a result of weak internal demand.[12]
Instead of resolving these problems, the export-led model deepened the trade deficit. In response, the state launched the National Pact for Industrial Emergence in 2005, marking a new industrial policy centred on supporting the private sector in new export-oriented specialisations referred to as Morocco’s ‘global professions’.[13]
Exporting, however, is not the core problem; rather, it is the social and political context and the classes that benefit from this model. Post-revolutionary Cuba offers a useful comparative example in this regard, as discussed by Galeano:
Actually, export crops are not in themselves incompatible with the welfare of the population, nor do they in themselves contradict an ‘inward’ economic development. Sugar sales abroad have in fact given Cuba leverage to create a new world in which all have access to the fruits of development, and solidarity is the axis of human relations.[14]
The literature of the past two decades broadly agrees that industrialisation is central to development. At the beginning of the new millennium, an official document marking the fiftieth anniversary of independence declared that the country’s principal obstacles to economic development lay in the ‘absence of an environment conducive to private investment and to the creation of businesses and wealth’.[15]
The aim of the investment landscape’s legislative, regulatory, and administrative reforms was to facilitate ‘integration into the global economy’. This took place through the signing of partnership agreements with the European Union in 1996, which entered into force in 2000, and the Morocco–United States Free Trade Agreement in 2004, which entered into force in 2006.
The state presented this opening as a means of ‘linking domestic production to that of its partners and expanding its potential for growth and returns’.[16] To this end, it promoted the objective of ‘enhancing the competitiveness of export sectors’, alongside a strategic shift toward Morocco’s so-called ‘global professions’.[17] These sectors were portrayed as a bridge toward achieving structural transformation of the Moroccan economy.
2.1. The Industrial Emergence Plan (2005–2020)
Based on a study conducted by global management consulting firm McKinsey & Company,[18] and inspired by the Mexican maquiladora,[19] Morocco launched its Industrial Emergence Plan in 2005. The study was described by the newspaper L’Économiste as a ‘highly confidential and controversial document’, and was criticised as ‘yet another costly study with limited results’.[20] Despite this, or perhaps because of it, the McKinsey study received strong backing from the World Bank.[21]
The Industrial Emergence Plan aimed, on the one hand, to accelerate the upgrading of Morocco’s industrial sector, and on the other, to enhance its competitiveness in a context of increasing economic openness and intensified capitalist competition. Its objectives included attracting new industrial investments, developing sectors in which Morocco was considered to hold a competitive advantage (the automotive, electronic and aerospace sectors), and redirecting exports toward high-growth markets.
By 2015, the programme projected an annual growth rate of 6%, the creation of 53 billion dirhams (approximately €5.088 billion) in value added, and more than 250,000 direct jobs.[22]
The second phase of the Emergence Plan, implemented under the National Pact for Industrial Emergence (2009–2015), focused on six ‘global professions’, ranked according to increasing levels of competitiveness. The sectors with lower competitiveness were those characterised by higher technological innovation, namely offshoring and the automotive and aerospace industries. The remaining three sectors, electronics, agri-food industries, and textiles and leather, were identified as having higher competitiveness and were classified as medium-technology sectors.[23]
To achieve these objectives, state industrial policy relied on what it termed ‘investment attraction initiatives’,[24] such as:
Infrastructure
Infrastructure policy prioritised the development of integrated industrial platforms for the exporting and automotive sectors. This also included the creation of future industrial zones designated as ‘integrated industrial platforms’.
The state relied on public financing and extensive borrowing to fund these projects, collectively referred to as ‘major projects’. These included ports, airports, highways, bypass roads, expressways, technical facilities, high-speed railways, tramways, industrial complexes, technological hubs, the redevelopment of major streets and the Corniche in the city, and the construction of new cities. Investment directed largely toward infrastructure reached approximately 30% of GDP.
Because these projects were financed through external debt, Akesbi argues that they are likely to contribute to a future debt crisis. He notes that ‘most public enterprises involved in these “major projects,” with few exceptions, face debt and serious financial difficulties’, including the National Railways Office, the National Office for Electricity and Drinking Water, and the Moroccan Agency for Sustainable Energy’.[25]
Public investment in infrastructure reached substantial levels, as reported by the High Commission for Planning in January 2016: ‘Total investment tripled between 2000 and 2014, rising from approximately 98 billion dirhams (approximately €9.408 billion) to nearly 273 billion dirhams (approximately €26.208 billion). Investment efforts were concentrated in infrastructure and construction. Spending in these sectors increased from 45 billion dirhams (approximately €4.32 billion) to 139 billion dirhams (approximately €13.344 billion), while their share of capital expenditure in construction rose from 45.5% in 1999 to 51% in 2014. As a result, the overall investment rate increased from 24.8% in 1999 to 35.1% in 2010, before declining slightly to 32% in 2014’.[26]
Nonetheless, this investment effort was inconsequential. The High Commission for Planning report cited above identified a problem of ‘weak investment efficiency’. It noted that between 2000 and 2014, so-called ‘emerging and developing countries’ recorded growth rates of about 6% with investment levels averaging 28%, below Morocco’s rate of 30%. Yet Morocco recorded a significantly lower growth rate of only 4.6%.[27]
Akesbi sharply criticises infrastructure investment, arguing that it served as ‘a pillar for private capital, with public finances subsidising its profitability’. He argues that this investment came at the expense of funding essential public services for the majority of the population, including education, healthcare, social protection, and public transport.[28]
The main problem of this large-scale infrastructure investment lies in its tendency to lock substantial amounts of capital, referred to as ‘patient capital’, into projects whose utilisation depends on the foreign private sector. Moreover, their actual returns remain far below their material, social and environmental costs. Had this investment effort been directed toward the creation of actual production units in industry and agriculture, or toward financing public programmes such as housing, education and healthcare, it would likely have generated far greater benefits.
Improving the Business Climate
The state adopted the new Labour Code in 2003, introducing greater flexibility into labour relations. It also reformed the education system by expanding vocational training and promoting specialisations aligned with emerging market trends. After decades of delay caused by disagreements between the capitalists and the trade unions, the state enacted a law criminalising the right to strike in September 2025.
In December 2022, the state introduced a new Investment Charter offering extensive incentives to entice foreign investors. These included the unrestricted transfer of net profits, with no limits on amount or duration, as well as the development of activity zones for industry, logistics, trade, tourism, and services designed to meet investor needs and ensure their development and use.
The incentives in the Investment Charter, however, have failed to deliver the expected results. Because most countries offer similar incentives, this ‘race to the bottom’ weakens Morocco’s fiscal capacity at a time of high public debt[29] and limited resources for industrialisation.
Moreover, successive amendments to labour legislation have increased precariousness, affecting wages, job security, and contributing to mass unemployment. Together, these dynamics further narrow an already limited domestic market, thereby undermining the prospects for launching a process of local industrialisation.
Promotion and Marketing of Morocco’s New Global Professions
The state launched an international promotion and marketing strategy to attract investment and create jobs. The Moroccan Agency for Investment and Export Development was established in 2009 and tasked with developing and promoting investment in the country.
The agency was tasked with promoting Morocco’s new global sectors and encouraging investment across the economy. In addition, the state introduced initiatives to strengthen value chains,[30] including facilitating access to finance for small and medium-sized enterprises.
Ultimately, the Moroccan state remained devoted to neoliberalism, the raison d’etre of the Structural Adjustment Programme. It restricts its role in production to support functions, relinquishing development and growth to the private sector, both domestic and foreign. The following section examines whether this objective has in fact been achieved.
2.2. New Industrial Policies and Morocco’s ‘Global Professions’
In 2014, the state launched the third phase of the Emergence Plans, known as the Industrial Acceleration Plan (2014–2020), following evaluations of the two previous initiatives, the Emergence Plan (2005) and the National Pact for Industrial Emergence (2009–2015). A 2014 report by the Royal Institute for Strategic Studies concluded that the two earlier plans had failed to meet their objectives, citing the lack of competitiveness of Moroccan industry. It attributed this outcome to ‘institutional constraints… that hinder structural transformation of the economy and the development of the industrial production base’.[31]
This assessment became a reference point for subsequent literature published between 2017 and 2021, most notably the 2018 World Bank report Morocco 2040: Emerging by investing in intangible capital. Across this body of work, there is a consistent emphasis on institutional reform – administrative, regulatory, and legislative – commonly framed as good governance. These reforms are presented as the main mechanism for encouraging domestic and foreign private investment and enabling industrial takeoff.
This evaluation focuses on the automotive sector, as it had attracted the largest share of foreign direct investment and had received significant media attention.
The automotive sector is not new to Morocco.[32] In 1959, the state established car manufacturing company SOMACA with technical support from Fiat in Italy and Simca in France. The state held 38% of the company’s capital, while Fiat and Simca each held 20%. Production reached a peak in 1975, with 25,000 vehicles assembled, but declined to 16,000 units by 1980.
In 1992, Morocco scrapped all customs duties on imported used vehicles, a decision that immediately reduced domestic production to around 4,000 units, comprising mainly small and low-cost models such as the Fiat Uno. From the early 2000s onward, French firms, particularly Renault, acquired control of SOMACA. The company was converted into a public limited company, 91% owned by Renault SAS and 8% by Renault Maroc, while private shareholders retained the remaining 1%. The trajectory of SOMACA encapsulates the broader history of industrial policy in Morocco since independence. It illustrates how trade liberalisation has further narrowed an already limited industrial base and opened the way for foreign capital’s offensive.
Official statistics present the automotive sector as a success story of Moroccan industrialisation based on integration into global value chains. A paper published by the Royal Institute for Strategic Studies in February 2022 outlines this success:
Morocco ranks among the world’s top twenty car-producing countries. In Africa, Morocco became the second-largest vehicle producer in 2019, after South Africa, and the leading producer of passenger vehicles. Total production reached 402,085 vehicles in 2018, representing a 6.7% increase compared to 2017, when output stood at 376,826 units. The automotive sector accounts for 29% of total national exports and has been the country’s leading export sector since 2014, surpassing agriculture and phosphates.[33]
Yet the benefits of this growth largely flow to foreign industry, not to Moroccan industry, a reality masked by headline figures on output and exports.
Integration into Global Value Chains
Integration into global value chains through Morocco’s ‘global professions’ has been presented as a pathway toward industrialisation and production diversification. In this vein, the Moroccan newspaper L’Économiste commented on the McKinsey & Company report that positioned the automotive sector as the backbone of the Industrial Emergence Plan, saying: ‘It was portrayed as a magic wand capable of lifting the Moroccan economy out of its state of stagnation’.[34]
Foreign direct investment has been presented as the main driver of this integration and development process. Several official and unofficial documents claim that this objective has been partially achieved. A report issued by the Royal Institute for Strategic Studies in February 2022 cites a local integration rate[35] of 50% in the automotive sector,[36] while the economist and member of the Moroccan Association of Economists, Larabi Jaïdi, estimates this rate at 60%, with the stated ambition of reaching 80%.[37]
Although these figures vary, the overall assessment remains the same: Morocco is presented as a leading industrial hub in North Africa. Other strands of the literature, however, challenge this narrative. As Pauline Liktardand Alain Piveteau argue: ‘Although new specialisation sectors such as automotive, aerospace, and electronics show dynamism to the point of transforming the export landscape, their scale and contribution to manufacturing value added remain insufficient to transform the production structure’.[38]
Even the Royal Institute for Strategic Studies, which had previously lauded the achievements of the new industrial policies centred on the ‘global professions’, ultimately acknowledged that the outcome was disappointing. The Institute noted that ‘the benefits of this dynamic were concentrated in a limited number of sectors, such as the automotive and aerospace sectors, while other sectors, including agri-food industries and textiles, were at a disadvantage. As a result, the overall outcome was described as mixed and even below expectations’.[39]Akesbi insists that the diversification of exports through the expansion of ‘manufactured goods’ remains confined to subcontracting activities.[40]
Moreover, Lahcen El Ameli criticises the frequent claims that local integration rates in the automotive sector have reached 65% in assembly activities and 85% in engine manufacturing. He emphasises that investors in the sector are primarily foreign-owned companies, adding that:
‘Production activities in Morocco developed around leading companies such as Renault, Safran, Airbus, Boeing, and Bombardier. These companies are subsidiaries of foreign entities in which Moroccan capital has so far only played a limited role across the various value chains’.
Crucially, El Ameli then concludes that: ‘with the penetration of foreign direct investment, the volume of production “made in Morocco” has increased, but not the share that is genuinely “made by Morocco”’.[41]
Since the 1980s, Morocco has experienced a form of early deindustrialisation. This process unfolded in two phases, as explained by Piveteau et al.:
Two distinct trends can be discerned during this period. During the [structural] adjustment phase (1983–1993), extending through the drought years of 1994–1995, fisheries and the agricultural sector expanded at the expense of the secondary sector. This pattern later shifted in favour of the tertiary sector, whose share of GDP increased from just over 50% in the early 1980s to nearly 60% in recent years. Overall, since independence, the economy has been marked by a stagnation and decline in the direct contribution of industry to wealth creation, whether measured at current or constant prices.[42]
In another assessment, Piveteau et al. argue that, ‘despite a genuine commitment from public authorities, sectoral diversification and improvements in production quality have remained fragile and have depended largely on the spatial diffusion of European companies’.[43]
This assessment suggests that the economic emergence plans centred on Morocco’s ‘global professions’, including the automotive industry, responded to shifts in the strategies of multinational corporations rather than to the developmental needs of the Moroccan economy. What the Moroccan economy requires, for example, is the development of an agricultural machinery industry, as this is currently entirely imported, rather than private passenger vehicles, most of which are produced for export to the European market.
The Cost of Attracting Foreign Investment
The cost of attracting foreign investment has been high, while its returns have remained meagre. El Ameli writes:
Morocco has benefited from substantial inflows of foreign direct investment over the past fifteen years compared to earlier periods. However, in the case of large projects, the host economy bears significant costs as a result of these investments. These costs must be carefully assessed and viewed as part of any cost–benefit evaluation of foreign direct investment if it is to contribute meaningfully to national development.[44]
El Ameli identifies the costs of attracting foreign investment as follows:
- advantages and incentives granted to foreign capital, including substantial financial incentives and public support;
- extensive tax benefits, such as exemptions from corporate income tax and export taxes for five years, a reduced corporate tax rate of 8.75% thereafter, exemptions from value-added tax, and related measures.
Bank Al-Maghrib echoed these concerns in a 2014 report. While acknowledging that Morocco has benefited from significant capital inflows in recent years, the report raised questions about ‘the extent of their contribution to economic growth and employment’. It also noted that the outflows of profit had begun to exert a significant impact on the balance of payments.[45]
Despite incentives, attracting foreign capital was difficult. Even when official figures are taken into account, Morocco ranks low among recipient countries. Akesbi underscores this point in The Moroccan Economy under a Glass Ceiling, stating:
These investments only represent a small share when compared to global foreign direct investment, or even to flows directed toward developing countries alone. In 2019, foreign direct investment inflows to Morocco amounted to 1.7 billion dollars, representing just 0.7% of global FDI, 0.3% of FDI to developing countries, and 2.9% of flows to the Middle East and North Africa region.[46]
Morocco ranks thirteenth among 20 African countries in terms of foreign direct investment inflows.[47] According to the 2023 annual report of the Office des Changes, FDI inflows to Morocco declined by 51% in 2022. The report also indicates that most of these inflows were directed toward non-industrial sectors, particularly real estate activities, transport and storage, finance and the insurance sector. Together, these three sectors accounted for 84.7% of total FDI inflows in 2023.[48]
2.4. Overview of the Export-Oriented Industrialisation Model
Faced with a limited domestic market, state industrial policies have consistently prioritised external demand. In the automotive sector, for example, around 90% of production is directed toward export markets, with approximately 80% destined for Europe.[49] These figures mask disadvantageous outcomes for the Moroccan economy.
Moroccan industry has, once again, found itself in the predicament it confronted during the import substitution policy era. It remains dependent on imported capital goods, exacerbating trade deficits. Despite the evolution of Morocco’s export structure and the relative increase in the share of manufactured exports, this progress has not reduced the trade deficit.
According to Akesbi, this outcome can be explained by two interrelated factors:
First, Morocco remains dependent on ‘essential’ imports. Second, the subcontracting-based production model promotes industrial exports that are themselves heavily reliant on imported inputs, resulting in relatively low domestic added value. This configuration produces a new form of dependency that binds exports to the expansion of imports, thereby reproducing the foundations of an uneven economic relationship.[50]
Morocco records one of the highest levels of import content of exports.[51] From the early 2000s until 2020, the import content of exports in Morocco averaged around 23% and reached 24.3%, higher than Egypt, Brazil, Chile, Turkey and South Africa.[52]
Table 2: Import content of exports over the 2010–2020 period.
| Egypt | Brazil | Chile | Turkey | South Africa | Morocco | Country |
| 8.6% | 11.9% | 12% | 20.3% | 20.5% | 24.3% | Rate |
Morocco has financed deficits of trade and balance of payments through extensive borrowing, while it has addressed weak purchasing power through an expansionary credit policy aimed at sustaining demand. A 2017 World Bank report attributed Morocco’s growth in the previous decade to ‘domestic demand amid rising indebtedness of the state, firms, and households’.[53]This pattern of growth is precarious. Thus, any disruption of the debt cycle risks undermining the reported gains in economic growth.
The Industrial Acceleration Plan (2014–2020) aimed to achieve deeper integration into global value chains by strengthening linkages between multinational firms and domestic companies. The results, however, remain contested. A report by the World Bank notes that Morocco, alongside Tunisia, is closely integrated into global value chains, particularly those involving European Union markets. According to the report, Morocco has successfully shifted from an economy exporting raw materials in the 1980s and 1990s to one exporting products with higher value added, especially in the electronics, automotive, and aerospace sectors.[54]
This success, however, is limited by the continued dominance of exogenous capitalism (through foreign companies), as acknowledged in the same report. Morocco’s position within global value chains remains characterised by a relatively low share of value added and a concentration in labour-intensive stages of production, particularly assembly, wiring systems, and seat manufacturing in the automotive industry.[55]
A separate assessment in OECD Economic Surveys: Morocco 2024 reaches a similar conclusion. It notes that ‘since the early 2000s, macroeconomic stability has been prioritised, private sector development has been encouraged, and industrial activity has expanded, driven by foreign investment. At the same time, services and agriculture continue to play a significant role in the economy’.[56]
In other words, after two decades of new industrial policies in Morocco, very little has changed. This is acknowledged in an official document titled Morocco 2050: Long-Term Low-Carbon Development Strategy, issued by the Ministry of Energy Transition and Sustainable Development of Morocco, which states:
Economic growth in Morocco continues to rely on agriculture, which is vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. The Moroccan economy is also characterised by a shift toward a tertiary sector-dominated economy, with advanced services accounting on average for 51.2% of GDP over the 2008–2018 period, compared to 15.6% for manufacturing industries excluding refining. Most of these services are of low value added.[57]
In a June 2019 report, the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation acknowledged that the unevenness of the Moroccan economy: ‘The Moroccan economy remains dependent on the success of a few products in traditional markets and the country is struggling to move up the value chain. Even in the automotive sector, exports are dominated by exports of cars from a limited number of foreign car makers.’.[58]
Although the context has changed, Morocco has continued to pursue an export-oriented industrialisation strategy. This persistence stands in contrast to the Trade and Development Report 2013 issued by UNCTAD. The report argues that export-led growth ‘can no longer be a viable option’ in the aftermath of the 2008–2009 global recession, given the sustained slowdown in consumer demand in advanced economies.
Despite this assessment, the Moroccan state has treated export-led growth as the only viable development path, introducing only limited conceptual adjustments. These revisions followed the COVID-19 crisis and the ensuing disruptions to global supply and value chains.
In the post-pandemic period, official discourse has increasingly emphasised ‘economic sovereignty’ and revived narratives of a ‘green transition’ and ‘green growth’, largely in response to European policies aimed at carbon neutrality. Yet these new framings largely reproduce the existing model, incorporating recent shifts such as the relocation of global value chains without altering the underlying export-oriented strategy.
A growing body of literature questions whether integration into global value chains can effectively support industrialisation in developing countries. One influential study by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa identifies two major changes in the global economic milieu that have made it impossible for today’s low-income countries, including those in Africa, to replicate the industrialisation trajectories of more advanced economies. The first is the shrinking of policy space following the establishment of the World Trade Organization and the proliferation of bilateral (and to a lesser extent regional) trade and investment agreements. The second is the expansion and consolidation of global value chains dominated by large multinational corporations, which has reduced the effectiveness and productivity of nationally driven industrial policies.[59]
Ali Amouzai
- This article is adapted from the study entitled “Green Industrialisation in Morocco”. It was originally published under the title “Assessing new industrial policies, 2005-2020”
[1] Ghoufrane, Boubrahimi and Diani. Industrialisation and Morocco’s Global Competitiveness.
[2] The Multi-Fibre Arrangement was a global agreement governing trade in textiles and garments from 1974 to 2004. It established export quotas for developing countries, such as Morocco, limiting their exports to developed economies. The arrangement aimed to protect domestic industries in advanced economies from competition with low-cost textile and garment imports from developing countries.
[3] Ghoufrane, Boubrahimi and Diani. Industrialisation and Morocco’s Global Competitiveness.
[4] Piveteau, Askour and Touzani. ‘L’industrialisation au Maroc’.
[5] Ghoufrane, Boubrahimi and Diani. Industrialisation and Morocco’s Global Competitiveness.
[6] Ghoufrane, Boubrahimi and Diani. Industrialisation and Morocco’s Global Competitiveness.
[7] Akesbi. The Moroccan Economy under a Glass Ceiling, p. 128.
[8] ATTAC Morocco and CADTM Morocco. (26 November 2016) ‘La Samir: A state economic crime’. https://www.cadtm.org/spip.php?page=imprimer&id_article=14235
[9] El Moden, W. (10 September 2024) ‘The SAMIR Case: From Abdelrahman Saidi to Aziz Akhannouch—A Chronology of a Real Disaster’. Le360. https://ar.le360.ma/economie/OJHHK76XBZF5JPJXMW6PCPTODA/
[10] Kably, M. (Ed.) (2011). History of Morocco: A work of synthesis and update. Rabat: Royal Institute for Research on the History of Morocco. p. 688.
[11] Outsourcing refers to an arrangement between two parties in which one party undertakes activities such as manufacturing products or providing services on behalf of another party, activities that the latter could otherwise perform internally.
[12] Kably, History of Morocco, p. 690.
[13] Ghoufrane, Boubrahimi and Diani. Industrialisation and Morocco’s Global Competitiveness.
[14] Galeano. The Open Veins of Latin America, p. 278.
[15] Kingdom of Morocco, Steering Committee for the Report. 2005. Fifty Years of Human Development and Prospects for 2025: General Report. Fiftieth Anniversary of the Independence of the Kingdom of Morocco.
[16] Kingdom of Morocco, Fifty Years of Human Development and Prospects for 2025.
[17] Kingdom of Morocco, Fifty Years of Human Development and Prospects for 2025.
[18] Ghoufrane, Boubrahimi and Diani. Industrialisation and Morocco’s Global Competitiveness.
[19] A Mexican maquiladorais an industrial zone located along the Mexico–United States border, where US-owned factories import duty-free raw materials and components from the US for assembly or processing in Mexico. The final products (medical devices, consumer goods, electronics and automobiles) are then re-exported to the United States. The first maquiladora factory was established in Mexico in 1961 to stimulate local economic activity and attract foreign direct investment, particularly from the United States.
[20] L’Économiste. (6 May 2005). ‘Industrial Policy: Details of the McKinsey Report’. https://www.leconomiste.com/politique-industriellebrle-detail-du-rapport-mckinsey/.
[21] Aujourd’hui Le Maroc. (15 September 2005). ‘The World Bank Supports the McKinsey Report’. https://aujourdhui.ma/actualite/la-banque-mondiale-appuie-le-rapport-mckinsey-35425.
[22] Ghoufrane, Boubrahimi and Diani. Industrialisation and Morocco’s Global Competitiveness.
[23] Ghoufrane, Boubrahimi and Diani. Industrialisation and Morocco’s Global Competitiveness.
[24] Ghoufrane, Boubrahimi and Diani. Industrialisation and Morocco’s Global Competitiveness.
[25] Akesbi. The Moroccan Economy under a Glass Ceiling, p. 129.
[26] High Commission for Planning. Study on the Return on Physical Capital in Morocco.
[27] High Commission for Planning. Study on the Return on Physical Capital in Morocco.
[28] Akesbi. The Moroccan Economy under a Glass Ceiling, p. 214.
[29] Akesbi. The Moroccan Economy under a Glass Ceiling, p. 90.
[30] Ghoufrane, Boubrahimi and Diani. Industrialisation and Morocco’s Global Competitiveness.
[31] Ghoufrane, Boubrahimi and Diani. Industrialisation and Morocco’s Global Competitiveness.
[32] Védie, H.-L. (2020) The Automotive Industry: A strategic Moroccan sector and Africa’s industry leader. Rabat: Policy Center for the New South. https://www.policycenter.ma/publications/l’automobile-une-filière-marocaine-stratégique-leader-du-secteur-en-afrique.
[33] Royal Institute for Strategic Studies. (2022). The Future of Morocco’s Global Professions: Strategic synthesis report. https://www.ires.ma/fr/publications/rapports-thematiques/lavenir-des-metiers-mondiaux-du-maroc-0
[34] L’Economiste (6 May 2005) Industrial Policy: Details of the McKinsey Report. https://www.leconomiste.com/politique-industriellebrle-detail-du-rapport-mckinsey/
[35] An integration rate in a value chain measures the share of activities or product components carried out by a single company or within a given country, as opposed to those outsourced. A high integration rate indicates that a firm or country controls a larger portion of the production process internally, from raw materials to final product, while a low integration rate reflects greater reliance on external inputs and subcontracting.
[36] Royal Institute for Strategic Studies. The Future of Morocco’s Global Professions.
[37] Jaidi. L. and Msadfa, Y. (2017) The Complexity of Moving Up Global Value Chains: The case of the automotive and aerospace industries in Morocco and Tunisia. Rabat: OCP Policy Center. https://www.policycenter.ma/publications/la-complexité-de-la-remontée-des-chaînes-de-valeur-mondiales-cas-des-industries
[38] El Aoufi and Billaudot (Eds). 2019. Made in Maroc Made in Monde, vol. 1.
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[51] ‘Import content of exports’ is an indicator referring to the share of imported inputs embodied in a country’s total exports. It measures the extent to which a country relies on foreign inputs in its export production.
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[57] The tertiary sector encompasses a wide range of activities, including trade and administration, transport, finance, real estate, business services, personal services, education, health care and social services.
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