Morocco seeks to benefit from the global debate on the transition toward green industrial policies and to adapt its economic policies to this trend. This article therefore examines the concept of industrial policy more broadly, as well as the definitions of new industrial policies and green industrial policies. It also explores the contexts and selective patterns through which the Moroccan ruling classes, namely the bourgeoisie and the monarchy, have adopted and interpreted these concepts, in an attempt to understand state policies from the beginning of the twenty-first century to the present.
1. Industrial Policy in the Moroccan Literature
Gregory Lazarev summarises the literature on development in Morocco as follows: ‘There was no theory of development. Rather, the history of development suggests that these differences and multiple adaptations produced a development process, not a theory’.[1]
As a result, sustained or substantive discussions of industrial policy, including new and green industrial policies, are difficult to find in the official Moroccan literature.
1.1 Official Literature
Bank Al-Maghrib (Central Bank)
The only official document in which an explicit definition of industrial policy was identified is the Annual Report of Bank Al-Maghrib (June 2023), which defines industrial policy as ‘targeted government interventions, such as subsidies, aimed at supporting local companies, industries, or economic activities in order to achieve specific national objectives, whether economic or non-economic, including climate-related goals.
In October 2016, Bank Al-Maghrib issued a report titled Roadmap for Aligning the Moroccan Financial Sector with Sustainable Development. The document states that the roadmap ‘is grounded in a broader economic and political vision in which public authorities play a central role by adopting measures promoting a range of green projects and encouraging the development of attractive sustainable financial products’.[2]
The Economic, Social and Environmental Council
The concept of industrial policy also appears in a 2017 document issued by the Economic, Social and Environmental Council, which states: ‘The 1973–1975 plan marked a turning point in industrial policy. Given the strong dependence of agricultural GDP on climatic conditions, public authorities made industrialisation a non-negotiable condition for economic growth’.[3]
According to that same document, Morocco subsequently abandoned this policy following the IMF’s intervention through the Structural Adjustment Programme in the early 1980s. In the mid-1990s, Morocco joined the World Trade Organization, whose founding conference was held in Marrakesh.
In the early 2000s, Morocco adopted what became known as ‘sectoral strategies’. The state intervened through substantial public investment to stimulate private investment in sectors identified as drivers of ‘economic development’, commonly referred to as Morocco’s ‘global professions’, such as the automotive, aerospace and electronics industries. State intervention has largely been confined to creating a favourable business environment through tax policy, labour legislation, and investment regulation, as well as through the development of infrastructure geared toward attracting private, particularly foreign, investment.
Royal Institute for Strategic Studies (IRES)[4]
A 2014 document by the Royal Institute for Strategic Studies[5] is of particular significance, as it originates from a royal institution. It therefore reflects the perspective of the ruling institution which not only monopolises political decision-making but also controls a substantial share of Morocco’s economic fabric.
The document addresses the notion of a ‘new industrial strategy’, namely the Industrial Acceleration Plan for 2014–2020. It emphasises the role of public policy in areas such as education and training, improvements in corporate governance and industrial infrastructure, and greater coordination and coherence across public policies and sectoral strategies.
This approach aligns with the role assigned to the state by international financial institutions, which confines state intervention to creating investment-friendly conditions while leaving investment activity largely to the private sector.
Ministry of Economy and Finance
The Economic and Financial Report issued by the Ministry of Economy and Finance and annexed to the 2024 Finance Bill[6] provides a detailed overview of green public policies and their underlying rationales. The report devotes significant attention to the objective of ‘decarbonising national industry’ and outlines a range of state-led initiatives and incentive measures.
These include the Tatwir–Green Growth programme, launched in January 2021, which aims to support small and medium-sized industrial enterprises in developing low-carbon production processes and products. The programme also seeks to foster the emergence of competitive green industries and to reduce industrial pollution.
The report also highlights dedicated financing mechanisms to support carbon reduction, including the Green Value Chain initiative and the Green Economy Financing Mechanism. These instruments, established by European partners and partner financial institutions, aim to enable small and medium-sized enterprises to finance green technologies related to resource management, renewable energy and energy efficiency.
Official Climate Literature
State-produced literature on climate change, mitigation, adaptation and the transition to a green economy is extensive. In December 2021 the Ministry of Energy Transition and Sustainable Development published the Long-term Low-Carbon Strategy Morocco 2050. The strategy does not provide a definition of green industrial policy. Instead, it presents an inventory of governmental and public measures adopted to implement the strategy, all of which are framed within the perspective of the IMF and the World Bank. The document defines the objective of the strategy as follows: ‘to develop an integrated and shared vision that defines the main orientations of the Moroccan economy and society between 2020 and 2050, and foresees long-term economic and social transformations in a carbon-free world’.
To achieve this vision, the following measures were identified:
The development of new green value chains aimed at enhancing the competitiveness of the Moroccan economy, while ensuring decarbonisation and proactive positioning in export markets. This approach takes into account developments among Morocco’s trade partners, particularly the European Green Deal and the African Continental Free Trade Area.[7]
Other state-produced literature on climate change and the transition to a green economy is addressed in Section Four below.
Partnership for Action on Green Economy (PAGE)[8]
In collaboration with the Ministry of Energy Transition and Sustainable Development, the Partnership for Action on Green Economy issued an extensive report titled Morocco’s Transition to a Green Economy: Current situation and outcomes. The document defines the green economy as follows:
A competitive, low-carbon, and circular economy based on responsible patterns of production and consumption, primarily reliant on clean energy, and grounded in best practices for the preservation and enhancement of natural resources and biodiversity.[9]
However, the report closely follows the conceptual framework advanced by the IMF and the World Bank in its treatment of new and green industrial policies. It emphasises ‘strengthening the strategic role of the state’, understood primarily in the sense of providing public goods, facilitating private initiative, market regulation, macroeconomic balances, and promoting the fastest-growing sectors.
In doing so, it echoes the IMF and World Bank in calling for the ‘systematic removal of administrative and regulatory barriers’ and the ‘strengthening of public–private partnerships’.[10]
Policy Center for the New South[11]
The Policy Center for the New South’s website published a document titled Transforming Economies: How is the green transition shaping trade and industrial policies? A focus on Morocco. In this document, industrial policy is defined as ‘government interventions aimed at modifying the economic landscape by directing resources towards sectors deemed crucial for future growth’.[12] The document presents the ‘green transition’ as the central objective of these policies and links it to the following process:
… a structural change, which reallocate[s] capital and labour from low- to high-productivity sectors, driving both economic growth and higher income levels. This accelerated structural change serves a dual purpose: first, to create wealth, even though economic development has so far been achieved at the cost of severe overexploitation of natural resources; second, to decouple economic growth from resource depletion and waste generation.
Nevertheless, the document remains closely aligned with the IMF’s definition of industrial policy, insofar as such policies are framed within ‘limited-scope government interventions’ and are restricted to a ‘strategic role of the state’ focused on removing obstacles facing the private sector.
2. Industrial Policy in the Literature of International Institutions
In April 2025, the World Bank published a collectively authored report titled Shifting Gears: The private sector as an engine of growth in the Middle East and North Africa. The report highlights industrial policy and the role of the state. It argues that the state intervenes in the economy through industrial policy and highlights the renewed interest in this policy area over the past decade. The report says ‘Although there is as yet no consensus on how to define industrial policy, a key characteristic is government use of instruments such as subsidies, exemptions, and export or import restrictions to correct a market failure and further a specific policy goal. The intention of industrial policy is structural improvement in the performance of the business sector.’[13]
In 2017, the World Bank published a report titled Morocco 2040: Emerging by investing in intangible capital.[14] The conclusion aligns with what international financial institutions commonly describe as a redefinition of the state’s role. Under this approach, the state fulfills a pragmatic role under the conditions of neoliberalism; it is expected to concentrate on its sovereign functions, regulatory responsibilities and strategic planning, while leaving economic activity and wealth creation to the private sector.
Notably, the report identifies Morocco as facing a ‘middle-income trap’,[15] yet it makes no reference to an ‘ecological trap’. Climate change is thus excluded from the future scenarios envisioned for Morocco up to 2040.
2.2. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
In a paper titled Industrial Policy Coverage in IMF Surveillance: Broad Considerations, published in February 2024, the IMF defines industrial policies as ‘targeted government interventions aimed at supporting specific domestic firms, industries, or narrowly defined economic activities to achieve certain national (economic or non-economic) objectives’.[16]
According to the paper, government interventions should remain ‘limited in scope’. They should focus on sectors where the market or the private sector fails to deliver desired outcomes, and where state intervention is required only temporarily while the private sector recuperates. Since the early 2000s, industrial policies in Morocco have closely followed the definitions and frameworks advanced by international financial institutions.
2.3. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
In its Trade and Development Report 2013, UNCTAD emphasises the role of the state, alongside market forces, in ‘playing an important role in support of industrialisation’. At the same time, the report criticises a trend that emerged in the early 1980s, marked by the shrinking of the state’s economic role in many countries through privatisation, deregulation and reductions in public spending. According to the report, this shift highlighted and deepened the precarious nature of the economic fabric.[17] In the Trade and Development Report 2021, UNCTAD defined industrial policy as ‘targeted and selective government policies to shift the production production structure owards activities and sectors with higher productivity, better paid jobs and greater technological potential’. In bringing climate change and the environmental question into sharp focus, this report argues that industrial policy should aim at exploiting the synergies between the two processes of ‘aligning productivity-enhancing structural transformation with shifts from high carbon-intensive to low carbon-intensive resource-efficient activities’.[18]
The 2021 report does not merely call for the revival of industrial policies but also advocates for a recalibration of the developmental state. This position draws on the experiences of East Asian countries that successfully transitioned into industrialised economies. At the same time, the report criticises the traditional development model adopted by these countries, which relies heavily on fossil fuels. It argues that such a model cannot meet the aspirations of developing countries seeking to raise national income through industrialisation, as it would push emissions and resource consumption beyond the planet’s ecological limits.
The proposed alternative is the construction of a diversified low-carbon economic system, supported by renewable energy sources and green technologies, in which economic activities are interconnected within and across sectors through resource-efficient linkages.
The Trade and Development Report 2021 outlines the structural transformations required in the global economy in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. Among its key priorities are a shift toward a low-carbon economy and the development of a diversified low-carbon economic system supported by renewable energy and green technologies. The report further argues that such transformations are unlikely to occur without a developmental state.
3. Industrial Policy: A Critical Perspective
3.1 The Limits of State Interventionism in the Literature
With the exception of UNCTAD reports, the literature reviewed above largely agrees that the role of public policy, including industrial policy, should be limited to correcting market distortions. From this perspective, state intervention is considered legitimate only when the private sector fails to fulfill its putative role.
Despite its observation that ‘industrial policy appears to be back everywhere’, the IMF endorses a highly circumscribed version of this return, restricting it to: ‘targeted interventions known as industrial policy to make domestic producers more competitive or promote growth in selected industries’.[19]
In its inventory of interventions associated with the new wave of industrial policy, the IMF identified more than 2,500 such measures worldwide in 2023. The Fund, however, criticised these interventions, noting that: ‘More than two thirds of these interventions were trade-distorting as they likely discriminated against foreign commercial interests’.
Thus, with a mild alteration, the neoliberal paradigm remains largely unchanged. Neoliberalism rests on the premise that any form of government intervention inevitably generates major market distortions, including the misallocation of resources and price distortions. According to this neoliberal (il)logic, the free market is inherently capable of correcting its own.
However, developments in the global economy during the last two decades of the twentieth century produced what social theorist and geographer David Harvey has described as the ‘neoliberal paradox’. Despite the romanticisation of free markets and the systematic discrediting of state intervention, Harvey observes that the actual record of neoliberalism in stimulating growth was ‘dismal’ and largely unsuccessful throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
According to Harvey, the principal exception to this pattern has been East and Southeast Asia, and to some extent India, where developmental states — far from being fully neoliberal — played a decisive role in shaping economic outcomes.[20]
A second observation regarding the definitions discussed above is that ‘greening’ is largely confined to decarbonisation and the transition toward a low-carbon economy. Other forms of environmental exploitation that have led to and exacerbated the environmental crisis are largely ignored, most notably extractivism. Ultimately, this greenwashing of the environmental crisis provides false explanations and solutions. It fails to acknowledge the ways in which the existing economic model of capitalism is itself responsible for the environmental crisis, and thus preserves the very dynamics that exacerbate planetary destruction.
International institutions, along with the official Moroccan literature on new and green industrial policies, nonetheless continue to insist on the well-trodden (neoliberal) path. Within this framework, the private sector, private investment and capital are presented as the sole actors capable of delivering structural transformation.[21] The role of the state is restricted to strategic functions, limited market correction, improvements to the business climate, and support for private-sector activity in areas where private investment is initially unwilling or unable to engage.
However, even in these cases, state intervention is designed to prepare such sectors for eventual private appropriation through delegated management, public–private partnerships, and various forms of privatisation. These dynamics are examined in greater detail in the sections that follow.
3.2 Context Overview: The rise of new and green industrial policies
An IMF blog published in April 2024 observed that ‘industrial policy appears to be back’,[22] framing recent developments as a novel shift. Such a claim warrants careful examination, particularly given David Harvey’s observation that government intervention has always played a central role in the economies of major powers. Harvey observes that ‘the irony is that both [the United States and China] have been behaving like Keynesian states in a world supposedly governed by neoliberal rules’, with the US relying on deficit financing and China employing debt-financed infrastructure and fixed-capital investment.[23]
In a booklet titled The Economics of Innocent Fraud, the American-Canadian economist and diplomat John Kenneth Galbraith similarly challenges the ‘myth of the two sectors’, that is, the distinction between the public and private sectors in the United States. He argues that ‘The accepted distinction between the public and the private sectors has no meaning when seriously viewed. Rhetoric, not reality. A large, vital and expanding part of what is called the public sector is for all practical effect in the private sector’.[24]
Hence, neoliberal principles are only applied to countries of the Global South, while advanced economies selectively apply them. This asymmetry also extends to trade rules. Together, these dynamics significantly constrain the actual scope for substantive industrial policies in countries of the Global South.
The catastrophic outcomes of structural adjustment programmes undermined the credibility of international financial institutions. They also contributed to growing recognition that the ‘Washington Consensus, which excluded any role for industrial policy, had not fulfilled its promises’.[25] As a result, a new consensus emerged around the need to explore alternative development paths, both among countries of the Global South and in some advanced economies.
According to the UNCTAD Trade and Development Report 2013, it was the global financial and economic crisis of 2008–2009 that ‘intensified debates around the failures of market and the need to regulate their functioning’.
These failures led countries of the Global South to call for greater state intervention, particularly in Latin America, where a ‘new developmentalism’ began to emerge.[26] Industrialisation and structural transformation subsequently returned to the agenda of development policy.
Engagement with the literature of international financial institutions, however, demands a critical stance. Calls for institutions and rules to regulate the functioning of markets do not imply a rupture with neoliberal doctrine or with the Washington Consensus. As noted in the UNCTAD Trade and Development Report 2021, the recent revival of debates on new industrial policies ‘is less the result of new analytical insights’. Similarly, according to economist Branko Milanović, industrial policies are ‘considered acceptable only in extreme circumstances’.[27]
The COVID-19 pandemic, together with global debates on climate change and the need for mitigation and adaptation, has helped greenwash discussions on industrial policy. Green industrial policies have, in turn, prompted debates on reevaluating the role of the state and on the most effective ways in which industrial policy can be used.
According to the UNCTAD Trade and Development Report 2021, this shift has been driven by ‘the growing recognition that the urgent large-scale transformations related to climate change adaptation cannot be achieved without active government support […] Given that moving towards a low-carbon economy implies a reshaping of economic structures, applying key principles of successful industrial policymaking can provide valuable insights for climate change adaptation policies’.[28]
However, the scope of green industrial policies remains confined within the limits set by international financial institutions for new industrial policies. Under this framework, the state is expected to act merely as a participant alongside the private sector, and to intervene only insofar as such intervention does not constrain the latter’s activity.
Moreover, the reluctance of major polluting actors, states and multinational corporations alike, to commit meaningfully to the outcomes of the Conferences of the Parties (COP) the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) exposes the limits of their professed commitment to a green transition. This reluctance is evident in the rejection of binding emissions reductions, the refusal to transfer technology, and the failure to meet financing commitments for mitigation and adaptation efforts. These patterns were once again underscored at the most recent COP, held in Belém, Brazil, in November 2025.[29]
The renewed adoption of industrial policies in the Global North is closely tied to escalating geopolitical tensions and trade conflicts between the United States and the European Union on one side, and the United States and China on the other. Kate Mackenzie and Tim Sahay in their essay[30] describe this confrontation as a ‘new cold war’.
These tensions intensified with China’s rapid rise and its emergence as an economic power rivaling the United States. In response, the administrations of Joe Biden and Donald Trump sought to contain China through trade wars, most notably through the imposition of tariffs, to which China responded with retaliatory measures.[31]
The United States now seeks to restore its position as an industrial power, which has been lost to China. To this end, it has adopted policies aimed at reshoring manufacturing activities and restructuring strategic supply chains in order to reduce dependence on Chinese firms.[32]
This is the context within which the ‘new wave of industrial policies’ and their greenwashing must be conceptualised. It is also the context in which countries of the Global South seek to position themselves in the arena of global competition among economic superpowers, aiming to benefit from these rivalries and from global green agendas, and to access promised financing and assistance for industrialisation, climate mitigation, and adaptation.
Morocco is no exception to this dynamic. The discussion of sectoral industrial strategies in the early 2000s emerged in the context of reassessing the ‘lost decade of growth’ following the implementation of structural adjustment programmes and the economic damage they produced. Similarly, the emphasis on the transition toward a green economy is driven by Morocco’s position as a Global South country exposed to climate disruption and by its attempt to benefit from ongoing international efforts aimed at mitigation and adaptation.
Ali Amouzai
- This article is adapted from the study entitled “Green Industrialisation in Morocco”. It was originally published under the title “New\ green industrial policies“.
[1] Lazarev, G. ‘A Brief History of Development in Morocco’. (2024) In N. El Aoufi, N. and S. Hanchane, S. (Eds.) Moroccan E-Handbook of Development Economics. Rabat: Laboratoire économie du développement. https://ledmaroc.ma/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/E-Handbook-Rhazaoui.pdf
[2] Bank Al-Maghrib (2016). Roadmap for Aligning the Moroccan Financial Sector with Sustainable Development. https://www.bkam.ma/ar/بيانات-صحفية/بيان-صحفي/2017/خارطة-طريق-من-أجل-ملاءمة-القطاع-المالي-مع-رهانات-التنمية-المستدامة-14-أكتوبر-2016-مراكش
[3] Economic, Social and Environmental Council. 2017. Changing the Development Model to Build a Dynamic Industry in the Service of Inclusive and Sustainable Growth. Self-Referral Report no. 30/2017. https://www.cese.ma/ar/docs/تغيير-النموذج-المعتمد-من-أجل-بناء-صناع/
[4] ‘The vocation of IRES is to contribute to making decisions on strategic issues. Its mission is to carry out strategic studies and analyses on matters submitted by His Majesty the King and perform a strategic watch function, both at the national and international level, in various areas considered as strategic for the country. IRES analyses domestic structural issues, examines Morocco’s external relations in their multiple dimensions and attaches great attention to global issues’. IRES. ‘Presentation of the Royal Institute for Strategic Studies’. https://www.ires.ma/en/ires/presentation
[5] Ghoufrane, Boubrahimi and Diani. Industrialisation and Morocco’s Global Competitiveness.
[6] Ministry of Economy and Finance (Morocco) (2024). Draft Finance Law for 2025: Economic and Financial Report. https://www.chambredesrepresentants.ma/ar/التقرير-الاقتصادي-والمالي-2.
[7] Ministry of Energy Transition and Sustainable Development, Department of Sustainable Development. 2021. Long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies (LT-LEDS) 2050. https://unfccc.int/documents/403585.
[8] The Partnership for Action on Green Economy (PAGE) is a joint initiative that brings together five United Nations agencies: the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). The initiative aims to support participating countries in transitioning in a more sustainable and inclusive way. PAGE is supported by a range of donors, including the European Union, Finland, Germany, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Arab Emirates. Morocco joined the initiative in March 2020.
[9] Ministry of Energy Transition and Sustainable Development and PAGE. (2022) Morocco’s Transition to a Green Economy: Current situation and inventory. https://www.undp.org/fr/morocco/publications/la-transition-du-maroc-vers-une-economie-verte-etat-des-lieux-et-inventaire.
[10] Ministry of Energy Transition and Sustainable Development and PAGE. Morocco’s Transition to a Green Economy.
[11] The Policy Center for the New South (PCNS) is a Moroccan research centre dedicated to contributing to the improvement of economic and social public policies. Its work seeks to position Morocco and the wider African continent as integral components of the Global South.
[12] Berahab, R. (2024). Transforming Economies: How is the green transition shaping trade and industrial policies? A focus on Morocco. Rabat: Policy Center for the New South. https://www.policycenter.ma/publications/transforming-economies-how-green-transition-shaping-trade-and-industrial-policies
[13] Gatti, R. et al. (2025). Shifting Gears: The private sector as an engine of growth in the Middle East and North Africa? Washington, DC: World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/4cffb130-9a22-4e6d-9698-f138782a7357
[14] Chauffour, J.P. (2017). Morocco 2040: Emerging by Investing in Intangible Capital. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/morocco/publication/morocco-economic-memorandum-2017
[15] The term ‘middle-income trap’ was coined by the World Bank to describe the situation faced by many middle-income countries in which sustaining economic growth becomes difficult, leaving them stuck between low-income and high-income status.
[16] IMF. (2024) Industrial Policy Coverage in IMF Surveillance: Broad considerations. Washington, DC. https://www.imf.org/en/publications/policy-papers/issues/2024/03/11/industrial-policy-coverage-in-imf-surveillance-broad-considerations-546162
[17] UNCTAD. Trade and Development Report 2013.
[18] UNCTAD. (2021). Trade and Development Report 2021: From recovery to resilience: The Development dimension. Geneva and New York: United Nations. https://www.un-ilibrary.org/content/books/9789210010276
[19] Ilyina, A., Pazarbasioglu, C. and Ruta, M. (12 April 2024). ‘Industrial Policy Is Back, but the Bar to Get It Right Is High’. IMF Blog. https://www.imf.org/en/blogs/articles/2024/04/12/industrial-policy-is-back-but-the-bar-to-get-it-right-is-high.
[20] Harvey, D. (2005) A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford : Oxford University Press. p. 154.
[21] World Bank. Summer 2024. Morocco: Economic Update—Unlocking the potential of the private sector to stimulate growth and job creation. Washington, DC: World Bank. https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099646407172428766.
[22] Ilyina, Pazarbasioglu and Ruta. ‘Industrial Policy Is Back, but the Bar to Get It Right Is High’.
[23] Harvey. A Brief History of Neoliberalism, p. 152.
[24] Galbraith, J.K. (2004) The Economics of Innocent Fraud: Truth for Our Time. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, p. 34.
[25] UNCTAD. Trade and Development Report 2013.
[26] Nem Singh, J.T.(30 November 2023) ‘Industrial Experiments’. Phenomenal World. https://www.phenomenalworld.org/analysis/industrial-experiments/
[27] Milanović, B. (8 January 2025) ‘How the Mainstream Abandoned Universal Economic Principles’. Substack. https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/how-the-mainstream-has-abandoned
[28] UNCTAD. Trade and Development Report 2021, p. 116.
[29] Ashley, B. (30 November 2025) ‘COP 30: Entrenching the Crisis of Climate Politics’. Links. https://links.org.au/cop-30-entrenching-crisis-climate-politics
[30] Mackenzie, K. and Sahay, T. (11 October 2024) ‘Marshall Plans’, Phenomenal World, https://www.phenomenalworld.org/analysis/marshall-plans
[31] Amouzai, A. (2025) Critical Raw Minerals in Morocco: An opportunity for industrialisation or a geopolitical battlefield between China and the West? Amsterdam: Transnational Institute. https://www.tni.org/en/publication/critical-raw-minerals-in-morocco
[32] Alami, I., Chodor, T. and Taggart, J. (14 June 2025) ‘Industrial Policy and Imperial Realignment’. Phenomenal World. https://www.phenomenalworld.org/analysis/industrial-policy-and-imperial-realignment/
